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The role of transmission investment in the coordination 
between generation and transmission  
in the liberalized power systems  
 
Vincent Rious1, Jean-Michel Glachant2, Yannick Perez3, Philippe Dessante1 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines how transmission coordinates with generation to the long term in a 
liberalized power system. We rely on a modular analysis to separate the mechanisms of coordination 
between generation and transmission of electricity into distinct modules. The governance structure of 
transmission completes this analysis framework. We then show that in a logic of complementarity, this 
governance structure influences the options that TSO implements to manage effectively power flows. 
Although locational signals are necessary to guide the installation of new power plants, the 
governance structure explains that investment in network may be the only effective method of long-
term coordination between generation and transmission. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In liberalized power systems, to ensure non-discriminatory access to transmission 
network, it was needed to unbundle vertically competitive generation and the natural 
monopoly of transmission network. Unbundling activities previously integrated in a vertical 
and horizontal monopoly creates problems of coordination between generation and 
transmission investments. We show that transmission investment is the mechanism that will 
effectively realize this new coordination to the long term in a liberalised power system. 
Facing this situation, Lévêque (2003) has shown that a centralized authority should 
send locational signals to generators to replace the traditional coordination. This centralized 
authority is called the Transmission System Operator (TSO). Therefore, we expect that the 
TSOs implement the best existing signals that should lead to efficient coordination between 
generation and transmission investments. But the study of TSOs shows that those who 
implement the more incentive locational signals are not those who experience the best 
coordination with generation. How to explain this paradox?  
To answer this question, in the first section, we propose and build an ideal TSO. We 
will use this ideal TSO as a benchmark for the study of coordination between generation and 
transmission of real TSOs. In the second section, we show that the incentive structure of the 
ideal TSO is difficult to achieve because the governance of electricity transmission assets 
influences the implementation of power flow management. Finally, in the third section, we 
apply this modular and organisational framework to compare two TSOs, 1° Pennsylvania, 
Maryland and New Jersey (PJM), and 2° National Grid. Then we will see what the central 
mechanism to coordinate generation and transmission of electricity is in real organizations. 
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1- Ideal organization of a TSO 
 
To manage power flows, the Transmission System Operators realize three main tasks 
that range from very short term (a few minutes to several hours) to the very long term (5 to 20 
years) (Brunekreeft et al., 2005). These three missions are: i) the management of short run 
power flow externality on the transmission network; ii) the development of transport capacity, 
and iii) coordination with neighboring interconnected systems. To study the multiplicity of 
real grid operators, we have shown in Rious et al. (2008) the relevance of a modular analysis 
framework à la Clark and Baldwin (2000) and Wilson (2002) to classify the existing 
empirical diversity of TSOs. Here we need only to focus on two missions: the short run 
management of power flow externality and the development of transmission network. If we 
choose the optimal option for each of these two missions, an ideal TSO can be defined. It is a 
combination of "nodal pricing" and, under a benevolent regulation, of the minimization of the 
total cost of network (that is to say, to minimize the sum of the congestion cost and the 
investment cost of the network). We will detail these two points and see why nodal pricing 
and long-term development of the transmission network are the building blocks of the optimal 
organization of an ideal TSO.  
First, the optimal short run management of power flow externalities is obtained with 
the system of nodal pricing of energy. Schweppe et al. (1988) show that an efficient power 
dispatch can be achieved through a system of nodal pricing of electricity whose clearing is 
constrained by the externalities associated with congestion of powerlines. This method has 
incentive virtues superior to those of the two other well-known power flow management 
schemes, zonal pricing4 and redispatch5. Thus nodal pricing determines a price of energy for 
each node of the network. These prices indicate the nodes where it is preferable to produce or 
consume one more megawatt taking into account the constraints of network capacity.  
Figure 1 illustrates nodal pricing on a simple two-node congested network. There is 
only generation connected to the first node S and its cost is low. To the second node D, there 
is a quantity Q of inelastic load and also generation whose cost is high. These two nodes are 
linked by a single powerline SD whose transmission capacity is K. If we ignore the limited 
capacity of powerline when clearing the market, generation to node S is sufficient to supply 
load (to node D). The equilibrium price is unique and is PE. This equilibrium induces a flow 
on line SD greater than the available transmission capacity K, that is to say K < Q. As a 
consequence, this equilibrium is not technically feasible. To incentivize generation to the 
nodes S and D to take into account congestion on the line SD, with nodal pricing, the 
generator at node S is paid a price PS below the equilibrium price without congestion PE and 
the generator at node D is paid PD a price higher than PE. In this case, the difference in value 
between the nodal prices reflects the social value of network externalities. This difference 
creates a surplus for the TSO called “congestion rent”. And the constraints of network 
capacity limit the maximization of social welfare by a quantity called “congestion cost”. The 
congestion rent is represented on Figure 1 by the grey rectangle and the congestion cost by the 
dark grey trapezoid.  
 
                                                 
4 Zonal pricing is similar to nodal pricing but only the most important network constraints are internalized in the 
pricing system of electricity market. The other minor constraints are managed by redispatch. This simplification 
from thousands of nodes to few zones is very sensitive to errors and gaming by generators. 
5 When congestions are managed by redispatch, they are not internalized in the electricity market. The TSO 
manages congestion after the market clearing by modulating production of the adequate power stations. 
Redispatch thus does not emit any locational signal, except for the modulated power stations.  
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Figure 1 Graphical representation of nodal pricing on a congested two-node network 
 
The second mechanism of coordination between generation and transmission is the 
long-term development of the power transmission grid. In theory, the management of power 
flow externalities can inform the TSO and the users of the network on the constraints related 
to the current state of operation of the network. But to the long run the TSO should also make 
efficient network investments to eliminate all the constraints on the grid that are economically 
excessive. If one considers by simplification that the TSO is benevolent and efficient, it must 
invest in order to reduce the social costs caused by the externalities of use of the network and 
so, in an equivalent way, to maximize social welfare.  
Considering this definition of the ideal TSO, the observation of the modes of 
organizations of real TSOs reflects a large variety of combination of suboptimal management 
schemes of power flows. This variety can be explained beyond the technical constraints of 
power flow management by the different characteristics of the governance structures of the 
transmission grid.  
 
2- Complementarities between the governance structure and the management of 
electricity flows 
 
In the liberalized power system, the TSO can take different organisational forms or 
governance structures, according to whether he owns the property rights of the network he 
manages, and according to the form of regulation that is applied to this monopoly. The 
governance structure of the network modifies the incentives that the TSO can perceive from 
the management of power flows. In this section, first of all, we define the governance 
structure of the network by presenting its main components. Then, we show that the 
governance structure of the network influences the options that the TSO implements to 
manage power flows.  
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2- a) The governance and the incentive regulation of the network 
 
The way the transmission grid is unbundled constitutes the ground of the governance 
structure of the network. Because it determines the degree of incentives that can be introduced 
into the regulation of this monopoly. Unbundling the transmission grid from competitive 
activities like generation or supply is currently considered essential. This vertical unbundling 
is of two degrees of intensity. The first level always includes the unbundling of short run 
system operation. Indeed, the withdrawal of system operation from incumbents is rather easy 
to impose in a process of liberalization because this activity represents a relatively small 
volume of investment and employment. To the contrary, the second degree of unbundling for 
ownership of the power grid depends on the possibility of forcing the incumbents to cede their 
network assets. This level of vertical unbundling is more difficult to produce at the time of 
competitive reforms. Indeed a pure generator faces competitive pressures and uncertainty 
from electricity markets. While the network is a source of regulated revenue that is guaranteed 
and recurring. This secured source of revenue is then very interesting and attractive for a 
generator in electricity markets where the companies are also judged on their financial 
performances.6  
The choices of the level of network unbundling can also be influenced by the 
interactions so called “border effects” between interconnected power systems. If ownership 
and operation of a grid on a continental scale are strongly fragmented between a lot of distinct 
TSOs, the loop flows between these TSOs create many border effects that are difficult to deal 
with and that can reach critical values for the reliability of the system. Then, operation and 
ownership unbundling of the network in each the TSO’s zone may not be sufficient to 
internalize the “border effects” and solve the associated problems. A remedy is then to 
remove the “System Operation” part from incumbents and to recompose this function on a 
wider geographical area including several electric zones, under the operational authority of a 
new Independent System Operator (ISO). The horizontal integration of system operation on 
wide zones then allows to internalize the border effects between the previous zones of the 
incumbents (Costello, 2001; PJM, 2004b).  
One can now distinguish two main families of TSOs in terms of degree of unbundling: 
the “heavy” TSO and the “light” TSO. A “heavy TSO” owns the network infrastructures that 
he operates. A “light TSO” does not own the network infrastructures that he operates. These 
modalities of grid unbundling are thus important at the same time to understand the efficiency 
of the governance of the transmission network but also its regulation as a monopoly. In the 
case of a “heavy” TSO, the regulator can impose an incentive regulation on the controllable 
costs of the network to set the income of this monopoly. Indeed, the potential financial risks 
of an incentive regulation are acceptable for a “heavy GRT” in terms of assets, equity and 
revenues. To the contrary, it is difficult for a regulator to incentivize strongly a “light TSO” 
because of its weak financial standing (few assets, little equity, low revenue). This is why the 
“light TSOs” are usually non-for-profit organizations, partly self-regulated by the market 
participants in its zone (Barker and al., 1997).7.  
 
                                                 
6 Moreover, ownership of the network can make it possible for the generators to protect strategically their 
generation portfolios in the development plans of the network. 
7 One will notice that the good functioning of this principle of self-regulation is efficient only under the 
assumption that there is no risk of collusion or capture of the TSO by a single group of interest (Boyce and 
Hallis, 2005). 
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2- b) The governance of the network and the management of power flows are complementary  
 
A TSO does not have the same incentives to manage and develop its network 
depending on the combination between its governance structure and its method to manage 
short-term externalities. Depending on the implemented method, the management of 
externality can generate rent or cost for the TSO. Nodal pricing effectively allows an efficient 
dispatching of generation taking into account the network constraints. But congestion rent 
arising from this method gives a counter-incentive signal to the TSO for its own investment 
decisions. Indeed, nodal pricing can incentivize a TSO maximizing its profit to make 
congestion last (Pérez-Arriaga and Al, 1995). A TSO that internalizes power flow 
externalities with nodal pricing should then be subject to a more demanding regulation to 
ensure that the maximization of the TSO’s profit is in line with the maximization of social 
welfare.  
On the contrary, the method called “redispatch” is considered inefficient to internalize 
the power flow externalities because the TSO then deals with congestion out of the day-ahead 
electricity market. In this case, no short-run locational signal is transmitted to the users of the 
network who cannot then make efficient use of the transmission capacity. But this method has 
the advantage that the TSO directly bears the congestion cost arising from system operation. 
Consequently, the TSO can here maximize its profit by comparing the social cost of short 
term congestions with the long-term cost of investment and maintenance of the grid and thus 
naturally maximizes social welfare.  
The structure of governance of the network and the design of the modules of power 
flow management must then be seen like a global system. The theoretical perfection would be 
to combine the options of the ideal TSO with a perimeter of heavy TSO, unbundled from 
generation and regulated with a strong but also incentivizing regulator. However the 
complementarities between the governance structure and the modules of power flow 
management lead to sub-optimal choices in the design of these modules. Compromises must 
then be realized between the control of the costs of the network and the design of the modules 
of power flow management.  
The study of two TSOs will show in the following section that their structure of 
governance influences the choice of the mode of coordination between generation and 
transmission. Thus some TSOs favor internalization of externality by scarcity pricing with 
given network capacity, while others act directly on the cause of externality by investing and 
increasing the transmission capacity. 
 
3- The comparison of two TSOs of reference: PJM and National Grid 
 
The objective of this part is twofold. First, we study the consequences of the 
complementarities on TSOs of reference to explain their choices to manage flows of 
electricity. We will proceed in two stages. First of all, we will compare the options of power 
flow management implemented by each TSO with those of the ideal TSO. Then, we will show 
how the structure of governance of the network constrains the implementation of these 
options. We show finally that the structure of governance can correct the failure of some sub-
optimal options of coordination.  
From this comparison, the second objective of this section is to show that the effects of 
complementarities brought by the governance of the network alternatively focus on the choice 
between “internalize externality of use of the network related to congestion” or “to increase 
the capacity of the network to treat the cause of congestion”. Then we will show that it seems 
very difficult to carry out these two tasks jointly.  
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3- a) Comparison of real TSOs to the ideal TSO 
 
Now we will use our construction of ideal TSO as a point of comparison for the study 
of real TSOs. We consider two TSOs of reference in the international experiments of 
liberalization of the power systems.  
The first, PJM, is a light TSO structured as a non-for-profit organization that operates 
in the North-East of the United States. PJM is recognized as a model because the nodal 
pricing enabled him to extend its area of responsibility over a wide part for the North-East of 
the United States and to become thus the TSO that manages the higher peak load in the world 
(Joskow, 2006). In spite of the implementation of the best method of internalization, the 
congestion cost of this zone strongly increased until 2006. In fact, before April 2004, PJM 
didn’t take into account the possibility to reduce congestion cost in the planning of network 
investments on its zone. The network investments were made only for technical reasons of 
reliability.  
The second model is the TSO National Grid. It is a heavy TSO, owner of the network 
he operates in England and Wales. He is unbundled from generation. He operates, maintains 
and develops the network of England and Wales. National Grid is a private company, quoted 
on the stock exchange, but regulated by the British regulator of energy, the OFGEM8 
(Joskow, 2006). This TSO is often quoted as an example for its efficiency in the management 
of the network within the framework of a liberalized power system (Rossignoli et al. 2005). 
While at the same time National Grid operates its system with redispatch and this option of 
congestion management does not internalize the externalities of use of the network. But the 
practical modalities of regulation applied to this monopolist for his system operation and the 
development of its network push it to invest in order to minimize congestion cost. Its 
congestion and investment costs have then be considerably reduced.  
We note that these two TSOs do not apply the combination of coordination 
mechanisms of the ideal TSO. And this, although they are both recognized at the international 
scales for the management of their network. In addition, the trend of congestion cost of TSOs 
is not coherent with the locational signals used by each one of these TSOs. Indeed, it is 
paradoxical that PJM sees congestion increased whereas its locational signals are very 
incentive. In the same way, it is paradoxical that National Grid has a good control of 
congestion, whereas its locational signals are theoretically weaker.  
In the following table, we summarize the comparison of these two TSOs, PJM and 
National Grid, with the ideal TSO, as well as the evolution of their congestion costs.  
 
Table of comparison of different TSOs 
 Ideal TSO PJM NGC 
Congestion 
management 
+ 
Nodal pricing  
+ 
 Nodal pricing 
- 
 Redispatch 
Investment 
+ Social welfare 
maximization 
- Decrease of 
congestion cost not 
considered  
+ Arbitrage between 
congestion and 
investment costs  
Evolution of 
Congestion 
   
Sources: Joskow (2006) and Rossignoli et al. 2005 
 
                                                 
8 Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
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3- b) Governance of the network and consequences on the options of congestion management 
 
The structure of governance of the network that completes our initial framework of 
analysis makes it possible to explain the options implemented by the TSOs and their 
performances to coordinate generation and transmission of electricity. In particular, the type 
of network unbundling is central because it determines the most suitable regulation that can 
be applied to the TSO.  
In the case of PJM, the grid remains the property of incumbents. The structure of 
“light TSO” of PJM has the advantage that it can be easily extended to integrate new zones in 
its market. This extension is all the more efficient as it is carried out thanks to nodal pricing of 
energy. The use of this method proves to be obligatory in the case of a light TSO like PJM 
because, by nature, PJM is insensitive to the congestion cost or the congestion rent resulting 
from the short run signals. Nevertheless, nodal pricing did not prevent a recrudescence of 
congestion on the zone of PJM.  
The increase of congestion revealed in fact an insufficient coordination between 
generation and transmission within PJM. This problem ended up by drawing attention of the 
federal regulator of energy, the FERC (PJM, 2004b; Joskow, 2005). Thus, it is only under the 
pressure of the FERC that PJM defined the concept of “Economic Planned Transmission 
Facilities” (Joskow, 2006). Without the constraint of the regulator, PJM would probably not 
have taken this initiative because its statute of light TSO does not incentivize him to do it. 
Indeed, the heart of its activity is the short-term management of grid and it is thus the 
extension of this activity of system operation which guides the development of PJM.  
Conversely, when the TSO owns the network like National Grid, the development of 
the infrastructure is its core activity. Network ownership then makes it possible to impose him 
an incentive regulation. Then, making him bear even only in part the congestion cost arising 
from redispatch incentivizes him to develop the network efficiently. Indeed, thanks to the 
structure of governance of heavy TSO of National Grid, an incentive regulation allows to 
control the congestion cost and, to a lesser extent, the investment costs of the network. This 
incentive regulation allows to compensate for the theoretical failures of redispatch related to 
the absence of internalization of externality. The regulation of system operation and of 
network ownership proposes to National Grid an arbitrage between the costs of system 
operation in the short and medium term and the investment costs of the network (Joskow, 
2006). In this framework, the incentive regulation of system operation prompts National Grid 
to arbitrate between the congestion cost and transmission investments of small sizes (with 
short periods of return on investment). While the long run budget constraint incentivizes 
National Grid to arbitrate between the investments of small size and the investments of bigger 
size, the latter being able to be less expensive thanks to the economies of scale that 
characterize power grid.  
 
3- c) Governance of the network and coordination between generation and transmission 
 
Our analysis makes it possible to show that, to deal with congestion, light TSOs and 
heavy TSOs choose basically different methods. The light TSO like PJM focuses on the 
internalization of congestion in a price system, while the heavy TSO as National Grid 
concentrates on the development of the network.  
The structure of governance of the network influences coordination between 
generation and transmission. Depending on its form, the governance incentivizes the TSO to 
focus either on internalization of congestion (with given transmission capacity) or on the 
development of the network (in order to treat the cause of these congestions). In practice, the 
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governance structure of the network makes it difficult to reconcile efficiently and 
simultaneously these two approaches of treatment of externalities.  
Considering the performances of PJM and National Grid, we note that the module of 
network investment holds a central place in coordination between generation and 
transmission. Even if the system of PJM is best equipped in locational signals, the evolution 
of congestion cost on its zone shows that the investments in network were insufficient. Then 
coordination between the investments in generation and network was not satisfactory. 
Conversely, National Grid is more concerned with the long run coordination with generation. 
That can be easily understood since he owns the network and prefers to develop it to eliminate 
congestion.9  
But considering the trend of congestion cost, the strategy of developing the network is 
more efficient. Of course, the locational signals are necessary to incentivize the location of 
power plants. But the generators have strong constraints of location to settle their new power 
stations. The primary energy source must be easily accessible. For the thermal power plants 
(with gas, coal or nuclear power), a river with an important flow is also necessary. Lastly, the 
generators must find lands that fit with these criteria at a reasonable price. These constraints 
for the generators lead to durable congestions for which the only solution is to develop the 
network.  
The network investment then holds a central role in long-term coordination between 
generation and transmission, and this for two reasons. Firstly, the structure of governance of 
the network can result in setting up little or no coordination signals. As a consequence, the 
coordination signals do not guarantee that the cause of congestion, related to the lack of 
capacity of the network, is treated.  
 
Conclusion 
 
We have shown that the complementarities between the structure of governance of the 
network and the modules of management of power flows influence coordination between 
generation and transmission of electricity, and this in two manners. First of all, the structure 
of governance of the network defines the degree of unbundling of the TSO from the rest of the 
electric system, which modifies the incentives that he can perceive in the various options of 
power flow management of flows. Then, depending on the structure of governance, only the 
sub-optimal schemes might be applied, in particular when the optimal options are 
counterincentive for the TSO in the configuration of its governance. But the structure of 
governance can also correct some failures of these sub-optimal methods. The conclusions of 
our analysis are thus more moderate than those of other studies (Boucher and Smeers, 2002; 
Ehrenmann and Smeers, 2005). Because they show that it is still useful to study the effects of 
these options on coordination between generation and transmission. Then, the study of PJM 
and NGC in terms of complementarity showed that the module of investment of the network 
has more influence on coordination between generation and transmission than internalization 
of externalities.  
Internalization of the externalities of use of the network is admittedly needed to 
effectively coordinate the production and the short-term and long-term transmission 
electricity. But, since the long term location of generators generates durable congestions on 
the network, only the development of transmission capacity brings a satisfactory coordination 
of these two activities. The module of investment of the network is thus the heart of 
coordination between generation and transmission of electricity. The complementarities show 
                                                 
9 This is also true when the locational signals are ineffective. 
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that the investment in network can be the only effective process of coordination between 
generation and transmission.  
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